This PR's author says there on October 1st: "Got an email from Oracle asking me to NOT proceed with a PR until receiving approval." and then on October 28th: "It's taken over by Oracle. Nothing required from us."
Someone reported java4shell bug in September 2026 (github.com)
black3r 5 hours ago
mzs 4 hours ago
https://github.com/adoptium/adoptium-support/issues/1480#iss...
edit: also oracle is big enough to have one of every modern gen to test on
pixl97 3 hours ago
They are the biggest asshole of a company when it comes to anything, but especially security issues. They are one of the least friendly companies to security researchers and are likely to attack you with lawyers.
Fuck Oracle. We should be putting them out of business.
malfist 2 hours ago
pixl97 2 hours ago
The sign: "Do not fall into the trap of anthropomorphizing Larry Ellison. Think of Larry Ellison the way you think of a lawn mower. You don't anthropomorphize your lawn mower. Your lawn mower just mows the lawn. You stick your hand in there, it'll chop it off, the end. You don't think "oh the lawn hates me!" the lawn mower doesn't give a shit about you. Your lawn mower can't hate you. Don't anthropomorphize the lawn mower. Don't fall into that trap about Oracle."
RIMR 2 hours ago
easterncalculus an hour ago
malfist 21 minutes ago
tejtm an hour ago
pixl97 an hour ago
If every bug was a zero day then we'd have never hooked things like water grids and electrical grids to networks. Grocery stores and bloodbanks would have never put freezers on the internet. Along with a million other huge security risks, too many to be named here.
The AI age has exposed that stupidity.
malfist an hour ago
josnyder 22 minutes ago
Capitalism rewards all sorts of safety requirements, if they become visible to a balance sheet within a reasonable period of time. Just look at marine insurance in the middle east right now.
The status quo is that IoT freezers are massively inconvenient every decade or so. Businesses can live out an entire lifecycle in this period of time, without the risk ever hitting their balance sheet.
pixl97 is saying: what if we made the risk far more common, so that its effect shows up on a balance sheet within 6-12 months?
wood_spirit 6 hours ago
cryptonector 5 hours ago
- why was this not a secure vulnerability report, why was it public?
- why was this closed [by the submitter]?
For the second question, I suspect it's because they were told a different fix was coming.
jakewins 5 hours ago
I know I have opened a lot of PRs where the only result is I get bot spam in my email and no project reaction, so I close the PR to stop the bot spam; if nobody from Oracle has reacted in 2 months it seems unlikely anyone will.
Nowadays I’ve stopped opening “cold-call” PRs like this. I find a way to chat with a maintainer first and anchor what I want to do (“I hit this bug, would you take a PR to fix it? I was thinking it could be solved by x, would that work?”
Much much better outcomes that way.
eru 3 hours ago
ApolloFortyNine 2 hours ago
ajasmin an hour ago
philipwhiuk 5 hours ago
Because it was seen as a crash not an RCE. AI's power has been chaining simple crashes into exploits. But that's not generally going to be true.
wat10000 5 hours ago
cryptonector 3 hours ago
eru 3 hours ago
pron 21 minutes ago
dlenski 5 hours ago
There are lots of bugs in lots of software, and lots of them get ignored when reported.
I personally aware of multiple security vulnerabilities in major pieces of software that everyone has heard of, which I very quickly and easily stumbled on while working on this software as an AWS engineer several years ago. I had never used an LLM of any kind at the time.
I presented my findings both internally and externally, and the reactions ranged from shrugs to delays to hostility towards me for "getting distracted" or "being overly negative."
Those bugs that I discovered still exist, last time I checked.
ajasmin 2 hours ago
darkamaul 5 hours ago
Nonetheless, being able to understand the criticality of a finding, and how to exploit it are other skills, that still require supervision.
eru 3 hours ago
I often do this when looking for low hanging fruit. A lot of the time you find half-abandoned PRs when the original author ran out of damns to give.
Botifier an hour ago
my-next-account 13 minutes ago
rzmmm 6 hours ago
Maybe simply a coincidence, but I would put my bets that the first person with the PR was also using Codex, and the model was exposed to the details of the bug.
rfgplk 6 hours ago
I have no idea why people keep talking like this. Probably because sadly most engineers lack the ego to back themselves up. Imagine if someone said this in 2015: "I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries. Well, more precisely, I told my compiler to read the source code and compile it like any serious software engineer in 2026."
Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.
NooneAtAll5 6 hours ago
p-e-w 5 hours ago
Izkata 3 hours ago
LoganDark 5 hours ago
I think there's a vast difference between giving source code to a compiler (even a superoptimizing compiler) and giving a prompt to a language model. This distinction absolutely deserves to be called out and not swept under the rug. It doesn't make you any less responsible for what you submit, but it's courteous to your reviewers to be transparent.
xmodem 5 hours ago
There is a massive difference between prompting "security audit this codebase, make no mistakes", performing an in-depth agent or LLM-assisted focused search for security relevant code, or otherwise manually reviewing code as we did in the pre-LLM era. It behooves us to be honest about our own personal contribution to our output - both towards others and to ourselves.
tkz1312 5 hours ago
boie0025 3 hours ago
wat10000 5 hours ago
Your hypothetical makes the opposite point from what you intend. If someone in 2015 said that they worked on a physics engine, and all they did was run the compiler on existing code, we'd laugh them out of the room. Pointing an existing computer program at existing work doesn't count as doing very much.
ShinyLeftPad an hour ago
Because when people really spend the effort required to fully review and own the result, somehow they don't have a problem of pointing at models.
kccqzy 2 hours ago
elashri 7 hours ago
egorfine 6 hours ago
bobmcnamara 6 hours ago
pron 18 minutes ago
egorfine 15 minutes ago
InsidiousWombat 6 hours ago
It was literal bug with provided fix. All it needed is someone to have a proper look.
But someone clowned a bot under a visionary thought "if nobody looked it must not be important" and here we are
stickfigure 6 hours ago
dboreham 5 hours ago
cryptonector 5 hours ago
philipwhiuk 5 hours ago
cryptonector 3 hours ago
> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.
It was obviously a security vulnerability. That the project didn't immediately re-write then close the PR and admonish submitter is astounding.
dpkirchner 2 hours ago
The takeaway from this is not "the submitter was wrong", it's "we need to move off of openjdk yesterday".
cryptonector 33 minutes ago
dlenski 5 hours ago
Sorry, but why?
Why should someone discovering a bug in an enormously complex piece of software have any responsibility for assessing the security implications of that bug?
If the maintainers wanted to make it private they could have done so.
cryptonector 3 hours ago
> The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.
That's obviously a security vulnerability. If they didn't understand that, how did they even find it?
pimterry 5 hours ago
toast0 4 hours ago
Why invest more time to close it? The automation will do it for you.
In this case, there's evidence from a linked issue that Oracle was in communication with the author outside the PR. When you get a ping, and you know it's being worked on outside the PR, it does make sense to close it, cause you know it's being resolved elsewhere.
eviks 3 hours ago
bombcar 6 hours ago
cryptonector 6 hours ago
lol768 2 hours ago
dboreham 5 hours ago
lol768 2 hours ago
frangonf 5 hours ago
Would it be better to have some Oracle gpus running the dukebot? Are the robobun and friends better at real triage/escalation? Could we automate the robobots to register the `java2root.com` domain on its own, release a blog post and post it in twitter/hn upon every successful security issue?
wat10000 5 hours ago
fn-mote 4 hours ago
Except soon you can expect LLM triage to be standard.
We would then find out if enough tokens would be invested in this one to figure out it was important, but any look is better than none.
I actually think the suggestion in the PR should have been auto accepted by an LLM.
pron 2 hours ago
We're not talking any large open source project here. We're talking about a project that, like Linux, runs much of the world's software infrastructure, and even bugs that could potentially be vulnerabilities need to be handled with great care.
ShinyLeftPad an hour ago
pron an hour ago
Also, it's not really a leaked 0-day because there's ways to go from a bug to an exploit (even going from Calif's detailed public report to an exploit is not trivial, because exploits depend on the particular application; there has been no disclosed exploit that requires only the JDK).
fulafel 7 hours ago
yread 7 hours ago
Alifatisk 7 hours ago
gruez 6 hours ago
echoangle 6 hours ago
layer8 6 hours ago
rustyhancock 6 hours ago
You might follow up with a De Bruijn/cyclic pattern and can see the overflow happen by step1 and precisely locate it by what replaces the A's.
https://youtu.be/L2j90atBpRU?is=q6W_1eF4viMoKZEA
Didn't the Alpine Linux bug also use A's for the exploit to login as root?
badgersnake 24 minutes ago
Although maybe they didn’t even know their LLM was doing this.