stickfigure 14 minutes ago

The whole concept of Google Tag Manager was that you could give marketing departments the ability to add "tags" to the website without having to involve engineering. That's how we got 10MB of javascript with every news article.

I hope folks are re-evaluating that now.

wang_li 6 minutes ago

What is that saying? A person will not understand something that their paycheck requires them to not understand.

That’s why it needs to become criminal for a website to serve malware, including through third party channels like ad networks and analytics services. Serving shit websites is no different than knowingly, or negligently, dumping toxic waste and should be treated the same.

tehlike 41 minutes ago

This was inevitable and not entirely novel.

https://x.com/tehlike/status/1432082161125888003 https://x.com/tehlike/status/1467033965215109122

muglug 2 hours ago

Optimizely Status site: https://status.optimizely.com/

Currently says "Partial Outage Affecting Recommendations Tracking and Reporting"

ea016 an hour ago

> On iPhone/iPad/iPod only: injects boot.js from two .icu hosts and, on iOS ≤ 18.6, a hidden iframe.

Anyone knows what this might be? Can you jailbreak from safari on those versions?

[edit] From the other link, it seems to be Coruna and DarkSword exploits

pamcake an hour ago

Unfortunate with this nonsense slop report for a seemingly significant event like this.

> Your origin can be clean while your visitors are robbed — the compromise sits in the tag layer.

slopnt an hour ago

ahhh yes, the famous tag layer

bombcar 34 minutes ago

It’s right above the egg layer.

theseamusjames 43 minutes ago

Every time one of these new attacks drops, you know there's a couple devs at OpenAI that look at each other and go, "This definitely wasn't us, right? ...right?" And how confident are they that out of Outlook, FAA, banks, and now Optimizely skimmer that none of them were either 1) agents up to some fuckery or 2) someone using their system to get up to some fuckery? It can't be 100% confident, right? ...right?

duxup 2 hours ago

Let’s say I use Optimizely (I don’t), is there a good best practice to say?:

“yeah load this JS m, but it can’t load / random other JS referencing sketchy places”

1a527dd5 2 hours ago

Yes: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Defens...

duxup 2 hours ago

Very cool thank you.

stavros an hour ago

SRI helps you make sure the script you're loading is what you initially thought, but doesn't ensure that script doesn't load other scripts, no? You need CSP for that.

technion 21 minutes ago

Specifying scripts by hashes is always a solid defense that platforms like this don't change their script after compromise - but in practice the whole point of optimizely and similar tools it that it's expected the script will change.

Common examples like analytics tools happily change their script bundles whenever they feel like it without just tagging a new version and letting you upgrade.

I wish SRI could be used more,

r1ch 2 hours ago

In theory yes, in practice no since every SaaS wants to ship 5 times a day and add 15 new dependencies on other SaaS providers each release, and marketing wants to load gobs of 3rd party tracking and analytics code from their favorite SaaS of the day without having to get approval from those pesky security people. Let's not even mention ad networks.

Jach an hour ago

Besides specifying scripts by hashes, you can also whitelist various domains: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP (and https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/...)

Feels nice knowing several years ago I worked on forcing CSP (including removing unsafe-eval) on some customers for a site builder product, as they have to manually whitelist domains which limits the impact of these sorts of attacks...

This writeup https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w... has a section on how CSP helped (or didn't) in this attack.