AWS says it can't restore some data from mideast facilities struck by Iran (wsj.com)
cmiles8 11 hours ago
Pogue asked, "I don't mean to give anyone ideas, but let's say I figured out that one of these unmarked buildings was an AWS data center, and I blew it up. Are you saying that it's so backed up and redundant that you probably wouldn't notice?" Wood replied, "Yeah, you wouldn't notice. I mean, we might be a bit upset, but you wouldn't notice!"
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cloud-computing-loudoun-county-...
sparkling 11 hours ago
bdangubic 10 hours ago
dzonga 9 hours ago
this is one of one of those things - were in the current era either a cloud provider should provide automatic backups in another geographic zone.
if you're in us-east, then your back-ups should ideally be in eu-west + africa for redundancy.
boelboel 9 hours ago
Twirrim 9 hours ago
The amount of data S3 stores "automatically replicating" to other geographical locations would make things prohibitively expensive, especially when you consider the daily delta, and how much of that is ephemeral or frequently mutated data that is stored. The bandwidth costs alone would be eye-watering, let alone the storage costs.
S3 cannot make any automated decision about whether data is, or isn't important, and if they did they'd only open themselves up to lawsuits if they guessed wrong. That's why it's made an option for the end user to enable replication if they want to, or choose to replicate their own data.
donavanm 8 hours ago
It did work like this! And it was! My recollection is that the first S3 was out of SEA and had no user concept of region. Then “VDC” was added in virginia. That provided API endpoints in what became us-east-1. A bucket could be accessed from either location, and the original intent was for object store to replicate between them. By the time dub/eu-west-1 came along that was obviously not tenable; itd take 10s of gbs to replicate.
So S3 became regional. But the original sea/vdc deployments still had shared APIs and data in both regions. Your object would be stored in the region of the API you geolocated to via DNS, but read from either. _eventually_ all the data migrated to IAD, but those API endpoints were transparently proxying across the continent until 2013 or so.
And of course glacier had much more interesting takes on this with cross dc/az/region erasure encoding. But i dont think any of the wacky multi dimensional cross region stuff ever materialised in practice.
PS: hi!
Twirrim 3 hours ago
2013-2014 would be about right, they were still in SEA when I joined in 2013 but were actively working on decommissioning it.
ern 9 hours ago
ployable7 6 hours ago
pianopatrick 5 hours ago
ngc248 2 hours ago
dogecoinbase 10 hours ago
selcuka 9 hours ago
krick 10 hours ago
houssc 10 hours ago
jacquesm 10 hours ago
jaggederest 8 hours ago
I feel like if this was done correctly it would eat a bunch of the market, but I question how many people are actually willing to pay for "the right way". The last time I had that experience it was with Heroku which was quite a leaky abstraction.
xboxnolifes 7 hours ago
zxilly 3 hours ago
jaggederest 2 hours ago
ngc248 2 hours ago
jaggederest 2 hours ago
And for that, with a simplified use case, well, they can scale up to $20k+ a month if they like, that would be ideal, and if they need a more complicated setup or enterpriseyness, migrate off with my blessing and available-not-required hands on support (again for a reasonable fee, maybe $10k if you want the white glove).
Avicebron 8 hours ago
SlightlyLeftPad 8 hours ago
sokoloff 7 hours ago
There are plenty of companies who pay no dividends and have not returned growth in share price. They’re still operating and no one’s coming to throw the execs in jail.
On the off chance that there is such a law, please cite it.
upboundspiral 7 hours ago
dotancohen 2 hours ago
paganel an hour ago
> Ce dérèglement se manifeste avant tout par la réduction de la démocratie à une logique juridique, le néolibéralisme ayant imposé une conception où le droit, érigé en garant exclusif de la liberté individuelle, relègue le politique à une fonction purement gestionnaire
automatically translated as
> This dysfunction manifests itself primarily through the reduction of democracy to a legalistic logic, as neoliberalism has imposed a conception in which the law—elevated to the status of exclusive guarantor of individual liberty—relegates the political realm to a purely managerial function.
RugnirViking 42 minutes ago
rjbwork 7 hours ago
This is true. The latter half of your comment is not. At best they have a duty to shareholders. But your assertion would mean every time a company posted a loss and the price went down the execs would be in legal trouble, which is nonsense.
datadrivenangel 6 hours ago
SlightlyLeftPad 6 hours ago
nixon_why69 2 hours ago
Something bad happens, stock goes down, angry shareholders sue because they should have been told the bad thing would happen and the stock would go down.
jasonkhanlar an hour ago
https://secform4.com/insider-trading/1018724.htm + https://i.imgur.com/tMBfGee.png = ?
Cue security entitlements, e.g. https://ndlegis.gov/assembly/69-2025/testimony/SJUD-2364-202...
houssc 7 hours ago
mhitza 7 hours ago
Not disimilar to how AI naratives are pushed on executives these last two years.
albert_e 5 hours ago
If businesses are going to cloud but without engaging / listening to competent people who know these basics -- then the blame needs to be somewhat pointed back at those very business leaders I feel.
This is not obscure magical knowledge either that is tightly controlled. Any cloud vendor will freely teach you that. Or even a google search would.
lelanthran 3 hours ago
I mean, every time cloud comes up on HN we see legions of techies posting strowman arguments about why you should offload everything onto AWS, GCP, Azure, etc.
avereveard 3 hours ago
silon42 2 hours ago
albert_e an hour ago
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/fis/latest/userguide/what-is.htm...
rob74 3 hours ago
jaggederest 2 hours ago
jval43 2 hours ago
But the problem is right there: "non-technical" leaders. Never work for one if you can avoid it.
BobbyTables2 7 hours ago
pianopatrick 5 hours ago
marcosdumay 8 hours ago
It's very clearly not about you being able to set-up redundancy for yourself.
cyberax 8 hours ago
But it's not designed to survive TWO datacenters going offline, and in a permanent fashion.
marcosdumay 7 hours ago
Dylan16807 3 hours ago
dotancohen 2 hours ago
_You_ are supposed to have three copies of everything - and two of those should be off AWS.
Dylan16807 2 hours ago
But when I put data on normal S3, isn't my money supposedly paying for triple redundancy?
Look, here's the documentation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/DataDu...
"S3 Standard, S3 Intelligent-Tiering, S3 Standard-IA, S3 Glacier Instant Retrieval, S3 Glacier Flexible Retrieval, and S3 Glacier Deep Archive redundantly store objects on multiple devices across a minimum of three Availability Zones in an AWS Region. An Availability Zone is one or more discrete data centers with redundant power, networking, and connectivity in an AWS Region."
As far as I've heard before that's not with parity and three zones means three copies. But when I search now I see things about 5+4 parity, any insight here?
Betelbuddy 2 hours ago
testbjjl 8 hours ago
thayne 3 hours ago
Not just in terms of service costs, but in time and complexity. In many cases building out that complexity is complicated and difficult. And sometimes the functionality you need isn't supported in the regions you use.
mitxela 3 hours ago
Brigand 2 hours ago
mitxela 2 hours ago
expedition32 28 minutes ago
sandeepkd 6 hours ago
jongjong 5 hours ago
So any software company/project which actually took the time and effort to fully handle the enormous complexity, they can't sell themselves based on that fact because every other company (who didn't invest the effort) is also claiming it and the customer has no mechanism to verify the claims until some major rare event occurs.
And most of the effort is required precisely to handle those 1% of rare situations.
rob74 3 hours ago
whizzter 33 minutes ago
dijit 3 hours ago
Do you want performance, or correctness.
Well, if you want performance you use write through caching and in the case of distributed storage: more nodes confirming the block before returning. Huge performance cost.
Outsourcing this just means someone else makes these tradeoffs, they will prioritise the general case- and they’re even more incentivised to move the needle towards things that are most visible to the end user.
In this case, performance.
You won’t notice that theres a third commit server off-site (unless that site is bombed), but you will notice slower writes- and the general case says that people will express comparative dissatisfaction with weaker performance and use it as a justification to use another provider.
jvm___ 2 hours ago
kakacik an hour ago
RugnirViking an hour ago
Its a cousin of the mindset that the reason people don't steal is because they think they will be caught and rationally weigh up based on the value they gain and the chance of loss that its not a worthwhile action.
No, most of the time people steal because they think its wrong, and they dont want to do it.
Public trust is a real thing and varies massively by country. America is notably extremly low on this metric
brador 2 hours ago
Melatonic an hour ago
general_reveal 39 minutes ago
So then that big thing comes to you. It’s all kind of … held together by a prayer …
Trust me I’ve worked at these big places. You wouldn’t believe how much fucking luck and grace from God is allowing you to do anything with your digital life. It’s a mindfuck of a tangled mess out there, eternities worth of written code that only God ensures works together at this point, only to get more hidden with AI.
gregates 33 minutes ago
For example, you mention Backblaze. Backblaze has public posts about their durability model. They claim to use 17:20 Reed-Solomon erasure encoding. That means there are 20 shards of a blob, and you can lose 3 of them and still reconstruct the blob.
Think about that for a second. If they store 4 shards in a datacenter, that means that a loss of that one datacenter is sufficient to lose the blob, forever. That entails that blobs are sharded across a minimum of 7 data centers, or the loss of one data center might mean permanent data loss. Which one do you think is true? (In fact it's pretty clear from Backblaze's public posts that they don't shard across data centers at all, only across racks within a data center.)
Now, AWS's availability guarantee — not their durability guarantee — entails that they use a less cost-effective erasure coding ratio. S3 is designed so that your blob is available even if a whole AZ goes down, and it's well known that most AWS regions have only 3 AZs. Therefore, if you tolerate the same number of shards lost to HDD failure as Backblaze in your durability model (3), then you might need 17:30 erasure coding to get the same durability and the required availability. That means S3 is storing way more physical bytes than Backblaze — 1.76x the logical size of the blob, instead of Backblaze's 1.18x. That's more expensive, but it also gives you better availability.
Which is also why One Zone S3 is cheaper — if you don't care about the availability guarantee, S3 can do what Backblaze does and save 33% on physical bytes, and they pass on 40–50% of those savings to the customer (this is fairer than it sounds — there's more overhead than physical storage bytes).
But here's the thing. AWS has more redundancy built in than Backblaze because they make availability guarantees in addition to durability guarantees. BUT the durability model is the same, which is why Backblaze can claim equivalent durability to S3. S3 in fact has better durability — they can survive the permanent loss of an AZ without necessarily losing blobs stored there (with the exception of One Zone blobs), and Backblaze cannot. But that's not actually a factor of the durability model, which is just taking into account normal events like HDD failure. Instead, S3 has durability that's more resilient to AZ loss because of their availability model. It's a side effect that isn't actually part of the durability promise!
echoangle 10 hours ago
nobodyandproud 10 hours ago
nomel 10 hours ago
lostlogin 4 hours ago
Bezos has been working with Trump. The instability has been hugely exacerbated by Trump. The issue lies at home.
wmf 9 hours ago
jaggederest 8 hours ago
They could, of course, open other regional data centers in other countries, or say "data in this geo zone may be in any of X, Y or Z" countries, but for the latter that pretty starkly limits some of the major customers they'd have, I would guess, and for the former, well, they have other geo zones already, so if people weren't replicating to them, I'm not sure why adding me-east-1 me-west-1 me-central-1 would fix that issue, they just wouldn't replicate there either.
kapilvt 7 hours ago
computomatic 3 hours ago
Amazon only claims "99.999999999% durability" per year, even for the properly replicated stuff.[0]
[0] https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/DataDu...
Terr_ 2 hours ago
Now I'm thinking about legal/contractual rules that might force that kind of geographic risk.
I mean, logically you could have the Allowable Location send pre-encrypted backups to anywhere in the world, except (A) laws and regulations aren't always logical and (B) you still have the problem of keeping the decryption keys somewhere safe without leaving the key jurisdiction.
jasonfarnon 10 hours ago
eastbound 4 hours ago
Obviously here, he should have mentionned that they can recover a hit on a single data center, provided the customer chose multi-AZ hosting. That's probably why companies run their ads on "This watch is a legacy for your children" rather than any material claim.
steveBK123 7 hours ago
There's a lot of magic & handwaving from hyperscalers like AWS about redundancy. I always wondered about some of the engineering to make this absolutely (and literally) bullet proof. At the end of the day most of their answers when you push hard enough involved paying 2-3x to run everything across multiple zones/regions, and lots of awareness in your application to handle this.
In any case, I think it's good that when a data center blows up the data is lost. Noteworthy for future skynet situation, etc.
antonvs 6 hours ago
Doesn’t really apply, because the only reason data was lost is because customers chose not to replicate it to other regions, either because of legal data residency requirements, cost, or just not bothering.
If Skynet wants to make sure it’s backed up, none of that prevents it from doing so. Although it would be amusing if Skynet was stopped by a billing alert when it tries to copy itself to another region.
htrp 6 hours ago
mitxela 3 hours ago
Betelbuddy 2 hours ago
A perfect example of a claim they never made.
Dban1 3 hours ago
ExoticPearTree 3 hours ago
Now, there are a few things to consider:
- AWS best practices recommend multiple AZs for workloads and cross-region backups for things like databases and other “stateful” data
- You have to read the fine-print on what AWS offers in terms of recovery: do they reffer to their own infrastructure when they say “you won”t notice” or your data
When Google’s Paris colocation facility was flooded and all AZs there went dark, they sent an email saying “restore from backup in another region and if we can restore your data, we will make it availbale to you”. They did not even issue credits for the downtime.
Betelbuddy 2 hours ago
He is also violating an enormous amount of compliance requirements, by disclosing the location of the data center, and having strange people inside making a tour. Did he vet the crew and their accompanying party? Did one of them accidentally left some kind of device within the insider perimeter? There at least one or two ISO certifications he is violating there. As customer I would be asking questions...
AWS always made very clear they wont copy your data to another region as only you know what your compliance and data residency requirements are. But at the same time they always said, its up to you to come your with your disaster recovery strategy based on your project requirements. And it has always been the case copying your critical data to another region is one of the first things on your check list.
And their Well Architected Framework and other docs make this plenty clear:
"It is a good practice to always make backups of your data, and copy these to another site (such as another AWS Region)."
Also...
"All DR strategies require that data sources are backed up within the AWS Region, and then those backups are copied to the recovery Region."
And also for single-Region / Multi-AZ architectures:
"Where possible, you should also copy data backups to another AWS Region as an additional layer of protection."
"AWS Architecture Blog — Disaster Recovery Architecture on AWS, Part II" has a whole section named "Backup to another AWS Region": "By copying your data to another Region, you can handle the largest scope of disasters."
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/disaster-recovery-...
Or "Creating backup copies across AWS Regions" - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/aws-backup/latest/devguide/cross...
This whole thread of people literally saying , "on no I trusted them...I did not know they could lose my data", with no technical context...is the the kind of incompetence I would expect from a generation raised on vibe coding and llm prompt driven miseducation...
jasonkhanlar an hour ago
articleAuthorName: cbsnews (hidden byline)
articleSecondaryAuthors: n/a
articleEditors: n/a
Is the author a human or machine? Google shows 1 result for "30dacdbc-6a8a-11e2-9d12-0018fe8a00b0" and Brave Search shows 5 results.
rishikeshs 11 hours ago
jackb4040 11 hours ago
r_lee 11 hours ago
birdatlaw 11 hours ago
jackb4040 11 hours ago
If OP tells me the name of his company I can hop in my time machine and tell him how it plays out.
noeltock 10 hours ago
tgsovlerkhgsel 10 hours ago
(The obvious option here might be an encrypted backup on some hard drives in a safe in a local office.)
rzzzt 11 hours ago
dotancohen 2 hours ago
SecretDreams 8 hours ago
dannyobrien 10 hours ago
[1] OK, "we" here is probably just me -- it was one of those things where the chances of successfully convincing anyone was so small, and the commercial advantages of just nodding along, and then changing your product offering was so great, that really very few people raised it or had reason to. But somebody had to!
kjs3 10 hours ago
Yeah, that was/is just another problem. Considering how that was actually handled in the real world before data residency laws came into force, I'm glad 'we' didn't convince those countries to put their citizens data at risk.
dannyobrien 10 hours ago
kjs3 9 hours ago
Us: We are concerned about our citizens (US) data, how are you managing the databases. Clout Provider (CP): They are only managed by fully background check employees. Us: Yeah, but where are they? What is their citizenship? CP: Um...mostly Eastern Europe. Lots in RU. (another CP proudly said "they're pretty much all in China...for cost containment"). Us: ...
Us: We are concerned about our citizens (EU) data, how are you managing encryption? CP: Everything is perfectly encrypted with hardware HSMs and all the FIPS and stuff. Us: So...where are the folks who run the HSMs? CP: Um...mostly SV. Some in the EU. Us: But can you assemble a quorum of US citizens for the HSM? CP: Of course! Us: ...
And on and on. Not to put too fine a point on it, many of us have no faith that vendors self policing international data protection in the face of government level pressure on companies and employees would work. Not that it can't, I don't think it would.
dannyobrien 8 hours ago
We may not be disagreeing that much. My argument was, and is, it's not about where the data is, it's about who has control over it. The counter-argument was "well if it's in another country, then we don't have jurisdiction, so it's going to be much harder". But what you need jurisdiction over is the people. Otherwise, you end up with multi-national corporate end-runs where you have shonky companies offering to store data locally, but who knows what department has control and access.
To be fair, the context I was having these conversations was countries arguing for data residency to combat the threat of mass surveillance (corporate and governmental) in the US, and the limited protections their users had relative to US nationals. But again, the problem is that it assumes that jurisdiction remains territorial: which is not how this was ever going to play out. The next wave after data residency requirements, beyond the usual extraterritorial intelligence community actions, was laws like the US CLOUD Act, the UK's Investigatory Powers Act, and Australia's TIA law, which effectively attempts to provide regular government departments and law enforcement with the legal ability to access data that would technically be on foreign soil.
My point was not that corporations should not self-police, but the concept of "it's stored here so we can oversee it" is not as clearcut as it seemed, and it risks introducing a new level of complexity to resiliently storing data. Which may be worth the price, but was never considered at the level this was discussed.
kjs3 8 hours ago
Best laid plans and all that.
dannyobrien 8 hours ago
kjs3 8 hours ago
You're saying (correct me if I'm wrong) that data sovereignty laws are unconditionally bad because they inevitably lead to totalitarian followon laws and there's nothing to stop them. I'm saying if we didn't have enforceable data sovereignty laws we would be in worse shape for data privacy and we should have prevented the followon laws from coming to be (and, true enough, we didn't).
Further, the UAE datacenter issue is a red herring. It's an engineering issue not a political one (data sovereignty without physical redundancy is...stupid?), but schadenfreude is a helluva drug.
dannyobrien 8 hours ago
No, I'm making no "unconditionality" claim here: there are just risks and benefits. Sometimes you're the person in the room highlighting the potential problems. The risk with doing that is that when those problems don't happen, you look like a fool. But someone should raise the problems anyway, because that's part of the risk assessment!
Of course, if the problems do happen, then you get to indulge in "I told you so". But only if you failed to convince anyone at the time.
mitxela 3 hours ago
mitxela 9 hours ago
dannyobrien 9 hours ago
mitxela 3 hours ago
You think most countries have one data center or less, and most offices have less than two hundred watts of electricity supply?
wand3r 9 hours ago
As an aside, it is quite crazy the world we live in. I am with the majority where I expected Amazon to be more redundant, but I still marvel at the assumption that a US dev can spin up multiple redundant and data sovereign servers in dozens of countries with efficient caching, failover and redundancy (enough to survive an earthquake or targeted missile attack) from their own home. Even a few hours of outage in a foreign country is considered unacceptable.
dannyobrien 8 hours ago
(I can feel someone saying "but surely having redundancy in one country is good enough, so I'll just say that I know relatively sane people who try to have hemispheric redundancy in their data, and also you never know when two different-in-every-quality-but one locations will suffer from the same disaster. Floods; heat-waves; national protests and strikes. It's surprising how often rare things happen!)
On your second point, it really is crazy. And also amazing that this is a capability that is -- or should be -- available to anyone in the world, not just in the US, and not just devs. Hopefully without also having to think about their data suddenly finding itself in a warzone.
simoncion 8 hours ago
This is why the minority of politicians who actually know about how this stuff works worry about where the data resides for jurisdictional purposes. If the government where the data resides can compel the folks who have physical and/or logical access to the physical machines that contain that data to give them access to that data, then that's game over for you.
«But you just don't permit that sort of breach to happen!» you might say. To which I reply "Yeah, right.".
Substantial physical separation of datacenters is very important, but the politics and policies of the location housing the data cannot be ignored.
dannyobrien 3 hours ago
We'd have to explain that if the data was physically in Brazil, but hosted by a U.S. company, that would not stop that company from accessing that data remotely -- unless you specified that. We'd have to also explain that if you were intended to defend against US mass surveillance of non-US persons by the US intelligence services, intelligence services and SIGINT are univerally almost defined by their broad remit to target foreign nations on their own territory in violation of local law. And, finally, if you intended to use the prohibiting the movement of of data as a sanction against companies to punish them for violating data protection standards, as pre-GDPR law in the EU had as an ultimate last resort, and the GDPR often ends up relying on as a last resort, you would find that multinationals are more capable of putting up servers in your home territory and continuing to serve your citizens than they are of substantially changing their practices regarding data processing.
I don't want to sound nihilistic about this -- regulations can exist in these areas. But it's those politics and policies of the institutions with control over the data that are the most important part of this: not where the bits are kept. Especially when those bits are encrypted, and the keys and access controls are elsewhere.
bonestamp2 8 hours ago
I generally agree, although if a small country only had half a dozen or so redundant data centers then it would be relatively easy for a powerful adversary to wipe out all of the data centers and potentially have a significant economic impact on that country.
Having a backup data center in an ally country might make sense. Kind of like how I keep an encrypted backup hard drive at my parents house. Whenever I go to visit I pull it out and backup my laptop there too.
dotancohen 2 hours ago
> I can assure you that lawmakers were not thinking about efficient disaster recovery plans or back ups when they made the laws.
That's why the input of actual specialists in a field should be the one drafting the policies. I'm glad that professional lawmakers exist, I personally couldn't draw up a proper par if I had to, but they are not and can not be specialists in every field.ngc248 2 hours ago
watwut 2 hours ago
And second, the USA is in the middle of power grab that completely ensures any data stored there will be taken hostage wherever suitable for "negotiations".
KaiserPro 5 minutes ago
As soon as you start specify technologies, rather than "sovereignty" you end up needing to created specific legal tests to stop people getting around it.
"Data must be stored domestically" is a short hand for being held in the same legal jurisdiction. This means for somewhere like the UK, you get all that battle tested data protections law for free. (new laws require case history to be reliable. Ie, prosecuting under a new law is hard, because if its on the edge of being legal, it can create a precedent that undermines the entire law)
In civil code places, its different, but I don't know enough to offer even a half arsed opinion.
The reason why jurisdiction is important is because if you are storing data outside of your legal protection, when something goes wrong there is little you can do to discourage fuckery.
This is the problem with blinkered engineering thinking. Yes geographically distributed data storage is good. But as you also know, storing it in place with lots of other data, means that its a target. The more places its stored, the more physical security you need. This means that there is higher chance of people being bribed.
Its not a binary, its a multi-dimension graph, with no one answer. Every dimension has a tradeoff.
UAE's tradeoff was: not even trump would ignore all the wargaming that clearly shows kicking iran in the nuts would have inflation rising consequences
jbverschoor 10 hours ago
alistairSH 9 hours ago
tacticus 7 hours ago
mitxela 3 hours ago
tacticus 8 hours ago
purpleidea 2 hours ago
gilbetron 8 hours ago
00deadbeef 3 hours ago
mitxela 3 hours ago
rcbdev 2 hours ago
mitxela 2 hours ago
f6v 2 hours ago
Serious question: how do we know something is or isn't an act of god?
matkoniecz 36 minutes ago
DeepYogurt 3 hours ago
pknerd 26 minutes ago
curuinor a day ago
e: Yep
jonahx 12 hours ago
rbanffy 11 hours ago
stackskipton 11 hours ago
lbreakjai 10 hours ago
eastbound an hour ago
Y-bar 4 hours ago
> In response to another question, Mr Vance rejected using the word “war” to characterise US operations in Iran, saying there was “no active shooting”.
advisedwang 11 hours ago
the8472 11 hours ago
JCharante 2 hours ago
beejiu 11 hours ago
LastTrain 11 hours ago
the8472 11 hours ago
mpyne 10 hours ago
the8472 10 hours ago
The region has seen a bunch of wars in the last 100 years, so the annual war-rate is > 1%. Even if we generously add the assumption that only 1 in 100 wars affects a datacenter you can see that wars become a major source of correlated hardware failures that they need to solve to actually deliver that kind of reliability.
mpyne 9 hours ago
ployable7 8 hours ago
Whereas with these force majeure events you’d want a complete DR setup, and it’s typically an async recovery. Here it is useful to understand the fault domain (single server or single building or multi-building) so you can plan.
Blending the two numbers doesn’t help you build better against the systems. And the force majeure events are rare enough that they won’t happen … until they do. I’m not sure that knowing the precise probability that Iran would attack a gulf nation would change the fact that if they do, you need to have a DR story.
mjr00 10 hours ago
You should check your home insurance contract, for instance... It likely would not cover an ICBM strike.
sire-vc 10 hours ago
eli 10 hours ago
unethical_ban 10 hours ago
throwawaythekey 9 hours ago
Offsite backups are sadly rare these days, and aws sales is the main reason why.
mitxela 9 hours ago
oatmeal1 5 hours ago
jameshart 11 hours ago
> In the unlikely case of the loss or damage to all or part of an AWS Availability Zone, data in a One Zone storage class may be lost. For example, events like fire and water damage could result in data loss
shepherdjerred 7 hours ago
I'm not going to complain to DoorDash if my order is delayed due to a car crash
Edman274 4 hours ago
shepherdjerred 3 hours ago
Did Amazon make such a promise? They didn't as far as I know. My understanding is they provide specific guarantees like given an AZ outage, your data is still safe (provided you architect correctly).
kmeisthax 5 hours ago
ciberado 3 hours ago
Art9681 12 hours ago
rbanffy 11 hours ago
Earlier this week I mentioned that if we lose enough data centres to bring our operation down, the first items in the to-do list becomes securing weapons, vehicles and fuel.
ares623 11 hours ago
"I was in the office, reviewing Terraform plans"
jiggawatts 11 hours ago
He just couldn't get past the notion that if the six copies in four buildings across two states were all simultaneously physically destroyed, then most likely there are also no more schools left standing, and hence the contracts to clean them are null and void. Also, payment is now in booze and ammunition, not dollars.
chasd00 11 hours ago
I toured a datacenter once back in the early 2000s and they showed me 30 days of generator fuel storage. When i asked them why 30 days and not 35 they replied "we're such a major customer of both electricity and fuel that if we don't get electricity or fuel for 30 days there's way bigger problems than your website not being online" hah.
mr_mitm 11 hours ago
ehe78qhe 10 hours ago
toast0 10 hours ago
Look at data center responses from Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. This guy [1] was onsite for Katrina. Lost utility power on August 29. They did have some access to fuel on Sep 1, but pretty spotty until maybe the 3rd. Looks like power started coming back in some places Sep 8, and maybe widely restored on Sep 14th.
I would say, by 7 days in you'll probably have a good idea of if 30 days might not be enough.
[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20061206181753/http://interdicto...
rbanffy 41 minutes ago
https://craphound.com/overclocked/Cory_Doctorow_-_Overclocke...
SoftTalker 9 hours ago
And if the data center is more than about 5 years old it almost certainly was not planned with adequate backup power to run racks of GPUs.
rbanffy 43 minutes ago
Anyway, we had a load shedding agreement with a large bank across the street from São Paulo and we could switch over to their Unisys mainframe in a matter of minutes, and vice versa.
rokhayakebe 11 hours ago
advisedwang 11 hours ago
Now if this was multi-AZ S3 or whatever then this would be significant.
The article does not tell us what products were impacted.
altcognito 11 hours ago
I get that S3 is convenient and reasonably performant, but it is not cheap at all.
kevml 10 hours ago
londons_explore 10 hours ago
They don't sell any of the lower and less reliable levels to the public, I suspect simply because the reputational damage from losing user data is so bad, and the news will take no notice of the fact the user got a discount for less reliable storage.
kccqzy 7 hours ago
mitxela 9 hours ago
cheeze 9 hours ago
jamesfinlayson 7 hours ago
cyberax 7 hours ago
If it dies, we will just have to re-download the data.
deathanatos 9 hours ago
I don't see where this is reported? TFA does not mention EBS. In fact, TFA seems to be nigh content-free, beyond "AWS (allegedly, and is uncited) says they cannot restore some data."
> The article does not tell us what products were impacted.
… right … which conflicts with EBS being what's reported …
(I would agree with your point that if EBS, or some AZ-level data was lost, then, yeah, that's the contract.)
cpncrunch 11 hours ago
yipinwong 11 hours ago
You talking as if this is some mom-and-pop shop that you run.
jeremyjh 11 hours ago
nixass 11 hours ago
firesteelrain 11 hours ago
XorNot 10 hours ago
Strictly speaking from a missile defense perspective there's an argument 2 sites are a waste of valuable interceptors.
tgsovlerkhgsel 10 hours ago
(Encryption handles confidentiality concerns.)
niij 9 hours ago
Which is why data residency is such a stupid concept.
firesteelrain 8 hours ago
There is nothing to say that a determined adversary may still get at your data so it needs to stay in country.
jamesfinlayson 7 hours ago
schwank 3 hours ago
abeyer 11 hours ago
KnightHawk3 10 hours ago
sparkling 11 hours ago
bigiain 10 hours ago
https://aws.amazon.com/s3/storage-classes/
"Additionally, S3 stores data redundantly across a minimum of 3 Availability Zones by default, providing built-in resilience against widespread disaster."
I wonder if "can't restore some data" includes any S3 data?
I'd expect to lose EC2 instance EBS data in the event of a datacenter being destroyed, but I kinda assume I wouldn't lose S3 data? Now I'm wondering if RDS backups are more like EBS or S3...
mitxela 9 hours ago
toast0 10 hours ago
Certainly, this event will inform people's disaster recovery plans, but when you're also looking at data residency requirements, small countries, and state level military action against your hosting provider, it can be hard to keep your data.
tjwebbnorfolk 10 hours ago
lstodd 7 hours ago
kjs3 10 hours ago
[1] That's a quote, including the Boston accent. [2] The only one I had that was better was a C-level who said "why are you asking for all this money for security in Azure. It's Microsoft so it's already secure.". That, too, is a quote.
lexicality 2 hours ago
KingOfCoders an hour ago
rbanffy 12 hours ago
vdfs 8 hours ago
weinzierl 8 hours ago
me (Middle East)
├── me-south-1 (Bahrain) DOWN since 2026-04
│ ├── mes1-az1 me (Middle East)
├── me-south-1 (Bahrain) DOWN since 2026-04
│ ├── mes1-az1 DOWN
│ │ └── mes1-mct1-az1 (Oman, Muscat)
│ ├── mes1-az2 DOWN since 2026-03-01
│ └── mes1-az3 DOWN
├── me-central-1 (United Arab Emirates)
│ ├── mec1-az1
│ ├── mec1-az2 DOWN since 2026-03-01
│ └── mec1-az3 DOWN since 2026-03-01
└── il-central-1 (Israel, Tel Aviv)
├── ilc1-az1
├── ilc1-az2
└── ilc1-az3
DOWN
│ │ └── mes1-mct1-az1 (Oman, Muscat)
│ ├── mes1-az2 DOWN since 2026-03-01
│ └── mes1-az3 DOWN
├── me-central-1 (United Arab Emirates)
│ ├── mec1-az1
│ ├── mec1-az2 DOWN since 2026-03-01
│ └── mec1-az3 DOWN since 2026-03-01
└── il-central-1 (Israel, Tel Aviv)
├── ilc1-az1
├── ilc1-az2
└── ilc1-az3nerdile 3 hours ago
weinzierl 2 hours ago
dhanudhakne 2 hours ago
dhanudhakne 2 hours ago
dhanudhakne 2 hours ago
markive a day ago
MiroslavPokorny a day ago
OrangeDelonge a day ago
dhx a day ago
It's always buyer beware for any claims of availability. Engineers completing a FMECA[2] will (or should) always state upfront what type of failure modes they've deliberately excluded (such as meteor strike) or else every FMECA would be full of failure modes that have never been measured, and are not worth anyone's time worrying about. These exclusions vary by application--a time capsule, seed vault, etc are intended to outlast wars and collapses of empires. Typically a bunch of data centres aren't designed to withstand such failures.
I do think however it'd be reasonable to include the prospect of war for calculating data centre / cloud service availability. Especially in a place such as Bahrain where the country is obviously concerned enough about the prospect of war to have built very permanent and expensive air/missile defence sites. New Zealand on the other hand--maybe not so important to consider.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49033240
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Failure_Mode,_Effects,_and_Cri...
0cf8612b2e1e 11 hours ago
testplzignore 11 hours ago
"You choose the AWS Region(s) in which your content is stored. You can replicate and back up your content in more than one AWS Region. We will not move or replicate your content outside of your chosen AWS Region(s) without your agreement."
ericpruitt 11 hours ago
bumblehean 10 hours ago
sparkling 11 hours ago
leftbehind 10 hours ago
nobody wakes up one morning and chooses to launch instances, CDN or S3 and would choose Bahrain as that without a requirement to, we were contractually and legally forbidden (in the middle as a vendor) to copy even encrypted data where we don't have the key out for redundancy, so the best we could do was tell our subcustomers to download all of their buckets to their office or some employee laptops at their office
zmgsabst 11 hours ago
Regions were always the scale of disaster isolation on AWS.
flumpcakes 11 hours ago
gregw2 11 hours ago
Although the more paranoid AWS customers who turned on (and pay for) S3 cross region replication or similar cross region DR for other services would be fine.
weinzierl 8 hours ago
me (Middle East)
├── me-south-1 (Bahrain) DOWN since 2026-04
│ ├── mes1-az1 DOWN
│ │ └── mes1-mct1-az1 (Oman, Muscat) ???
│ ├── mes1-az2 DOWN since 2026-03-01
│ └── mes1-az3 DOWN
├── me-central-1 (United Arab Emirates)
│ ├── mec1-az1
│ ├── mec1-az2 DOWN since 2026-03-01
│ └── mec1-az3 DOWN since 2026-03-01
└── il-central-1 (Israel, Tel Aviv)
├── ilc1-az1
├── ilc1-az2
└── ilc1-az3
Not sure about the Muscat local zone, whole me-south-1 region has been reported down despite Muscat still being operational.If someone had told me a year ago that a whole AWS region could go down I'd called them crazy, but now me is close to exactly that happening.
See also previous discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49033240
chasd00 10 hours ago
tgsovlerkhgsel 10 hours ago
skybrian 11 hours ago
expedition32 34 minutes ago
genxy an hour ago
Eastmill 8 hours ago
brightball 8 hours ago
Sometimes those rules can have serious consequences.
vanjajaja1 9 hours ago
but one in a trillion...
Kvarnek 9 hours ago
ernsheong 10 hours ago
mitxela 9 hours ago
michael-bey 12 hours ago
NegativeLatency 11 hours ago
noir_lord 11 hours ago
Multi-cloud in the same country (if that exists in the country and is far enough apart) maybe.
criemen 11 hours ago
flumpcakes 11 hours ago
toast0 10 hours ago
me-south-1 is about 250 miles away from me-central-1, but that's not far enough in this instance. Given that, I think city level location information should be good enough.
250 miles is pretty good for weather or not specifically targeted destruction (wildfire / industrial explosions / arson), but it's clearly not enough if your data is in a building targeted in a regional war. Assuming datacenters remain targets in wartime, I think it's fair to assume if one datacenter in any particular country is attacked, all the rest of the datacenters in that country are likely to be attacked, too. In that case, offline storage (tapes and things) in inconspicuous locations might be the way.
krick 9 hours ago
ares623 5 hours ago
(or an AWS Outpost thingy, assuming those things work even if the mothership is down)
tgsovlerkhgsel 10 hours ago
a) letting customers in other areas know that their data is backed up to another continent
b) asking the AI model of your choice to translate the following into PR-speak: "Because of the boneheaded data residency requirements in this country, all your data is gone, and we weren't able to do anything about it - here's an empty copy of a re-setup version of whatever infrastructure we provide, glhf setting up everything from scratch, hope you had backups"
For customers who use such a provider or operate primarily in that area: Restore from local backups, or tell whoever depended on you that everything is gone and if you really didn't have backups, probably close up shop.
simoncion 7 hours ago